Woodford goes to Africa by Kang Yong Tan & David Vines












Woodford goes to Africa 
 
 
Kang Yong Tang 
David Vines 
 




July 2007                      
World Economy & Finance Research Programme 
▪ Birkbeck, University of London ▪ Malet Street ▪ London ▪ WC1E 7HX ▪ Woodford goes to Africa￿




This paper analyses the e⁄ects of in￿ ation shocks, demands shocks, and aid shocks
on low-income, quasi-emerging-market economies, and discusses how monetary policy
can be used to manage these e⁄ects. We make use of a model developed for such
economies by Adam et al. (2007). We examine the e⁄ects of four things which this
model features, which we take to be typical of such economies. These are: the existence
of a tradeables/non-tradeables production structure, the fact that international capital
movements are ￿ at least initially - con￿ned to the e⁄ects of currency substitution
by domestic residents, the use of targets for ￿nancial assets in the implementation
of monetary policy, and the pursuit, in some countries, of a ￿xed exchange rate. We
then modify the model to examine the e⁄ect on such economies of three major changes,
changes which we take to be part of the transition by such economies towards more fully-
￿ edged emerging-market status: an opening of the capital account so that uncovered-
interest-parity comes to hold, a move to ￿ oating exchange rates, and the replacement
of ￿xed stocks of ￿nancial aggregates by the pursuit of a Taylor rule in the conduct of
monetary policy.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyses the e⁄ects of macroeconomic shocks on a small open economy that is
designed to capture the behaviour of a typical African economy. Domestic residents only
engage international capital markets through currency substitution. We study ￿xed and
￿ oating exchange rate regimes, and perform analysis making di⁄erent assumptions about the
degree of openness of capital markets. Initially there is no responsiveness of foreign capital
in￿ ows to domestic conditions, but, subsequently, we study the e⁄ects of highly mobile capital
￿ ows. We discuss how ￿scal policy and monetary policy can be used to manage these e⁄ects.
Our work makes use of a model developed for such economies by Adam et al. (2007) for such
purposes.
We examine the e⁄ects on the results of four things which this model features, which we
take to be typical of such economies. These are:
(a) the existence of a tradables/non-tradables production structure,
(b) the fact that international capital movements are con￿ned to the e⁄ects of currency
substitution,
(c) the use of monetary targets in the implementation of monetary policy, and
(d) the pursuit, in at least some such economies of ￿xed, or quasi-￿xed, exchange rates.
We then modify the model to examine the e⁄ect on such economies of four major changes
- changes which we take to be essential for the transition by such economies towards more
fully-￿ edged emerging-market status. These are
(i) a move to ￿ oating exchange rates,
(ii) an opening of the capital account so that uncovered-interest-parity comes to hold,
(iii) the replacement of ￿nancial aggregates by the pursuit of a Taylor rule in the conduct
of monetary policy.
Our work is one of the ￿rst attempts to examine the e⁄ects of the kinds of macroeconomic
policy now common in developed countries on emerging market economies. What we present
is still very preliminary. Our analysis is in the spirit of Woodford￿ s book Interest and Prices,
and hence the title of this paper.
2 The Questions which We Consider
Consider an economy that is subjected to demand, in￿ ation, and aid shocks. Suppose that
the ￿scal institutions for macroeconomic management in this country are not well developed
and that it is monetary policy which is required to restrain this economy. Should it have a
￿xed exchange rate, or ￿ oat? And how should monetary discipline be conducted?
2Let us ￿rst suppose that the model of this economy could be analysed using a Mundell
Fleming model, with a low degree of capital mobility. The e⁄ect of an in￿ ation shock will,
if the exchange rate is ￿xed, cause the real value of the currency to appreciate, which will
damage the export sector. If there is a ￿ oating exchange rate, then the currency will appre-
ciate and the export sector will again be damaged, not by domestic in￿ ation but by currency
appreciation. The e⁄ects of government expenditure shock would be that a shock to expen-
diture would cause an in￿ ation shock, detailed outcomes would depend on the conduct of
monetary policy. An aid shock would increase domestic demand and cause an appreciation
of the exchange rate, to an extent that is dependent on the openness of the international
capital market. This is basically what the Mundell Fleming framework would tell us.
But studying the e⁄ects of cost push shocks, demand shocks, and aid shocks is more
complex than this. That is because these shocks cause interactions between ￿scal policy
and monetary policy. It is conventional to study such interactions in systems in which (i)
monetary policy follows a Taylor rule and (ii) ￿scal policy is conducted so as to ensure longer-
term ￿scal solvency, allowing short run variations in ￿scal outcomes of an unbalanced kind.
(See Kirsanova, Stehn and Vines, 2005, for example.) We do not pursue that course in this
paper. This is because the interactions between monetary policy and ￿scal policy are made
more complex by the currency substitution assumption which is at the heart of what we
are studying here. Instead we examine the interactions between monetary policy and ￿scal
policy in which the conduct of ￿scal policy is highly simpli￿ed. There is ￿scal solvency, and
no treatment of the automatic stabilisers. But we study the e⁄ect of the government budget
constraint and of di⁄erent supplies of assets, caused by di⁄erent decisions about government
funding, and we examine the e⁄ects of this on the behaviour of the private sector. Thus
the ￿ndings of the paper must be treated as tentative, in that there is much that we have
simpli￿ed.
What we explore here is the way in which outcomes depend on the conduct of monetary
policy, and on the nature of the exchange rate regime. That much is clear from the Mundell-
Fleming model. What is not clear from that model is how the private sector will respond to
the persistent changes in ￿nancial assets which will result from the budgetary consequence
of the shocks, even ignoring the e⁄ects of automatic stabilisers.
The outcomes will clearly depend on the private sector economic structure, in two impor-
tant ways. The Woodford tradition, and the Adam et al. model supposes that consumption
behaviour is forward-looking, and can be modelled by a Euler equation. In such a setup
consumption depends on the real interest rate, which will, of course, be in￿ uenced by the
conduct of monetary in the face of the shock. The outcomes will also depend upon the in-
￿ ation process. In the Woodford tradition and the Adam et al. model, that is also assumed
3to be forward-looking. These strong assumptions will of course have implications for our
￿ndings.
3 The Model
This section explains the structure of the model that we use. It is a small open economy
model that is designed to capture the behaviour of a typical African economy. It is built
based on micro-founded ￿ New Open Economy Macroeconomics￿literature.
There are two types of good produced: exportables X and non-tradables N. There are
three factors of production: capital, intermediate goods (oil) which is imported, and labour.
Aggregate supply has a speci￿c factors form, i.e. the stock of capital is ￿xed in the two
sectors. Labour is assumed to be mobile across sectors. Relative supplies of tradables and
non-traded goods are governed by the real exchange rate. Following the New Keynesian
literature, the non-traded goods prices are sticky following a Calvo pricing rule. This means
that the output of non-traded goods is demand determined in the short run.
The household consumes both imports and non-tradables. The household holds domestic
money, foreign currency holdings, and government bonds. There can be accumulation of
foreign currency by the private sector, either as a result of changes in reserves held by the
central bank, or by means of a current account surplus. Both domestic money and foreign
currency satisfy the transactions demand for money. There is ￿ currency substitution￿between
domestic and foreign currency holdings. This means that there is imperfect capital mobility.
This feature di⁄ers signi￿cantly from the common assumption on uncovered interest rate
parity as is typical in the small open economy New Keynesian literature. Government bonds
are indexed to the CPI (non-tradable).
In this paper, ￿scal policy is ￿ disciplined￿ . By ￿scal discipline, we meant that an increase
in aid does not lead to looser ￿scal policy with a corresponding increase in government ex-
penditure. As such, public expenditures for both exportables and non-tradables are assumed
to be ￿xed, and ￿scal policy responds to aid increases in terms of cuts in taxes. Again these
cuts are ￿ discplined￿ , lasting only as long as the change in aid. Monetary policy involves
choices about transaction in foreign exchange market and buying or selling government secu-
rities with the private sector. In this paper we study ￿xed exchange rates (implemented by
managing the accumulation of reserves) and compare these regimes with ￿ oating exchange
rates, where there are no changes in reserves. We also study regimes in which there is a
greater degree of openness in the capital account. For that, UIP is introduced to bring the
model closer to the small open economy New Keynesian framework. To bring Woodford to
Africa eventually, we introduce a Taylor rule in the conduct of monetary policy.




m Demand for money (domestic currency)
f Demand for foreign currency
￿ Share of spending allocated to non-traded goods
G Government consumption
DN Output of non-traded goods
￿N Non-tradable in￿ ation rate
p Aggregate price level
￿ In￿ ation rate
e Real exchange rate de￿ned as
PNt
Et .
x Depreciation of nominal exchange rate (in local currency per unit of foreign currency)
I Nominal interest rate
R Real interest rate
y Aggregate output level
ca Current account balance
def Fiscal balance (>0 denotes de￿cit)
tr Taxes (net of transfers received from the government)
z International reserves
b Government securities held by central bank
a Aid
gN Demand shock
cp Cost push shock
The de￿nitions of variables used in the model are shown in Table 1. Notice that in some
equations, steady state values of the variable, which are exogenous, appear in the equation
with a bar.
3.1 Demand













Both CN and CI are non-tradable and imported goods of single variety. Correspondingly,































where Mt and ft are end of period holdings of domestic and foreign currency respectively.
The level of nominal exchange rate is denoted by Et.














where ￿ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)￿1 is the discount
factor. The household budget constraint is derived as follows. Besides domestic and foreign
currency, households have access to CPI-indexed government bonds. Thus, household wealth
Wt = Mt + Ptb
p
t + Etft. Let Yt denotes the non-interest income of the household and TR
that of the taxes net of transfers to the government. The budget constraint is
Wt = Mt￿1 + Rt￿1Ptb
p
t￿1 + Etft￿1 + Yt ￿ TRt ￿ PtCt
where Rt￿1 = 1 + rt￿1 is the real interest rate to bonds from the period t ￿ 1. Imposing
PPP (i.e. in this context, that importables sell in home markets at prices which re￿ ect
foreign prices, after adjustment by the exchange rate) and normalizing the foreign prices
of importables to 1, the constraint can be divided throughout by Et to express in terms of
importables. In what follows, lower case letters re￿ ect this normalization. Thus, the budget
constraint is re-written as
wt = mt + ptb
p
t + ft = X
￿1
t mt￿1 + RItptb
p
t￿1 + ft￿1 + yt ￿ trt ￿ ptCt
where RIt = 1 + rIt = Rt￿1
￿t
Xt is the normalized real interest rate, ￿t = 1 + ￿t = Pt
Pt￿1 is the
in￿ ation factor, and Xt = 1 + xt = Et
Et￿1 is the exchange rate depreciation factor.
Using the budget constraint, we can obtain optimal consumption and demands for do-
mestic and foreign currency. The Euler equation expresses consumption in terms of the real

























































From the CES function of C, we can write the respective demands for tradable and non-




1￿￿t respectively. Let ￿ denotes the












The government consumption for both tradables and non-tradables are given by:
GNt = eGN +
bN
et
(st ￿ s) + gNt (8)
GTt = GT + bT(st ￿ s) (9)
where the public expenditure spending on aid is
st = s + (1 ￿ ￿)[Wt￿1 + (1 ￿ pdr)(at ￿ a)] (10)
and gNt is an exogenous shock to government expenditure on non-tradables. To re￿ ect this
feature, we can set ￿ = 0 and pdr = 0 simultaneously. In what follows, we focus on disciplined
￿scal policy, and to do so, we set bN = bT = 0.







Ct + GNt (11)
3.2 Supply and Prices






















where ￿ is the elasticity of transformation in output. In what follows, we impose for simplicity
that ￿ = 0, and ￿ = 1=2, so that there is no substitutability in production between the sectors
in response to changes in relative prices. As a result all such substitution falls on demand.
The supply of exports equals capacity supply.
QX = QX
The price of non-tradables is sticky; the production of non-tradables is equal to demand,
which can be di⁄erent from capacity. Prices of non-tradables adjust to the gap between
demand and supply in a Calvo manner, as follows. The ￿ parameter￿  is a reduced-form
construct derived from the structure implicit in a Calvo model of the adjustment of prices.











where cpt is an exogenous shock re￿ ecting cost push shock and a high value of   re￿ ects
greater price ￿ exibility. Alternatively, we could introduce more persistence in the Phillips
curve by rewriting it as log￿N
t = ￿f log￿N
t+1 + ￿b log￿N





+ cpt. As ￿b ! 1,
price rigidity would then be large. We have experimented with this variant, but do not report
the results here.





















The relative price of non-tradable goods is denoted by e. If we let PNt be the price level
of non-traded goods and Et the level of nominal exchange rate (in terms of local currency





The rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate can be inferred from the values of e




8There is clearly a relationship between the nominal and the real interest rate as follows.
(The dating convention derives from the fact that both i and ￿ have a backward looking
de￿nition whereas the de￿nition of R is forward-looking.)
It = Rt￿1￿t (16)
The total output of the economy is given by the following equation. We have abstracted
from any e⁄ects of changes in the price of the imports of intermediate inputs, e.g. oil prices.
Such analysis has been conducted in Adam et al. (2007).
yt = et!NQNt + pXt!XQXt (17)
3.3 The Fiscal Position, Aid, and the Current Account
To understand how we introduce in￿ ows of foreign capital into the economy, note that we
can write the UIP equation as follows
















t is the nominal interest rate in the rest of the world, xt+1 is the expected rate of
depreciation, ￿ is a very small parameter capturing the risk premium attached to domestic
assets. We study the e⁄ect of perfect capital mobility, in which case foreign holdings of
domestic bonds are required to adjust to ensure that equation (18) holds, with a very small






If, say, home interest rates are too high for equation (18) to hold then that will cause an
increase in b
f
t. But given the supply of total bonds bt is determined by the ￿scal feedback rule
presented in Section 3.5 below, that will reduce b
p
t, and will mean that, from a government
budget constraint, the supply of money would be higher, and so, from the demand money
function, the interest rate will be lower.
By contrast, for the analysis of regimes without in￿ ows of foreign capital these two equa-





The current account of the balance of payments may be derived by subtracting absorption
from output as follows
cat = yt ￿ etGNt ￿ GTt ￿ ptCt + at ￿ pt(Rt￿1 ￿ 1)b
f
t￿1 (20)
9and a current account surplus enables either the building up of domestic holdings of foreign
currency, or an increase in reserves, as follows
￿ft + ￿zt + ￿b
f
t = cat (21)
The budget de￿cit is given by the following equation, where the ￿rst term denotes the










t￿1 + etGNt + GTt ￿ trt (22)
The government budget constraint is given by the following equation. The right hand
side shows what we can call the outlays of the government valued in terms of importables.
The second term denotes seigniorage receipts and the ￿nal term denotes the value of aid,
which accrues to the government and reduces its need for other sources of ￿nance. The ￿rst
terms of the left hand side of the equation is the increase in the real stock of money. The
next two terms is the net increase in the real stock of domestic bonds after adjusting for the
presence of foreign bonds. The ￿nal term exists because, for any given government funding
















mt￿1 ￿ at (23)
Since this model is designed to study the e⁄ects of aid surges, important assumptions
are made about how ￿scal policy reacts to such changes. The determination of government
expenditure, valued in terms of imports, eGN and GT, have been described earlier. By
assumption there is no change in the value of government expenditure, i.e. bN = bT = 0.
From (8), as the relative price of non-tradables changes, the actual expenditure on non-
tradables falls one-for-one with any increase in e. The e⁄ects on tax receipts are explained
in the following equation. They clearly depend on st which clearly depends on aid ￿ ow at
conditional on the value of pdr. In what follows, we set pdr = 0, i.e. an increase in aid will
be matched one-for-one to a reduction in tax receipts.1
trt = tr ￿ (st ￿ s) + (etGNt ￿ eGN) + GTt ￿ GT (24)
1We could possibly investigate the e⁄ects of ￿ incomplete pass-through￿by setting pdr < 1. But this is left
for further research agenda.
103.4 Monetary Policy: Fixed versus Floating Exchange Rates and
Perfect Capital Mobility
If the exchange rate ￿ oats in this model then the change in reserves is, by assumption,
￿z = 0. The policymaker can choose to manage the exchange rate by setting z1 to non-zero
values. If the exchange rate is to follow a tightly managed crawl, then we need to set z1to a
large value, to ensure that x follows the desired path. In what follows, we set z1 = 1000 for a
￿xed exchange rate regime. The central bank will then need to accumulate whatever change

















where z1 = 0 for ￿ oat and z1 = 1000 for ￿xed, and z2 takes a small value to capture
accumulation of reserves over time.
3.5 The Funding of the Government De￿cit and Taylor rule
We now consider the ￿ ￿scal funding rule￿ . In Adam et al. (2007), the authors study the case
where the government￿ s funding needs are met either by money or by bonds. Recall that
these needs are what is left after allowing for ￿ seigniorage receipts￿ , ￿
1+xtmt￿1. The equation
describing the funding rule can be written as follows.
pt￿bt = b1
￿





+ b2(zt ￿ zt￿1) ￿ b3pt(bt￿1 ￿ b)
￿b4
￿






There are two alternatives to the funding of ￿scal de￿cit. First, under ￿ bond ￿nance￿ , none
of these needs will be met by increases in money and changes in international reserves will
be sterilized. To do so, b1 = b2 = 1. Alternatively, these needs can be met by increases
in the money stock, with no changes in the bond stock, which means that there will be no
sterilization of any changes in foreign exchange reserves. In this case, b1 = b2 = 0.2 As
discussed in Agenor and Montiel (1999), lessons on sterilized intervention remained mixed.
In particular, in this model, the private sector can respond to a ￿xed stock of money by
obtaining liquidity through the use of foreign asstes. This can cause large ￿ uctuation in the
2The parameter b3 is present entirely for computational reasons, and is small. In all simulations it is set
equal to 0.05.
11exchange rate. Thus, in what follows, we focus on the non-sterilized case.
We explain the implementation of the Taylor rule as follows. Two key assumptions are
required: (i) all of the ￿scal funding needs are money ￿nanced, such that b1 = b2 = 0 and (ii)
the bond stock is chosen so as to drive interest rates in such a way that the economy ends
up following a Taylor rule. Of course in doing this we must allow for the fact that foreigners
are demanding some of the domestic bond supply and this has been accounted for with the
introduction of b
f
t earlier. The Taylor rule takes the form





where the current interest rate depends on the in￿ ation rate one period into the future; it
is thus a form if ￿ forward-looking￿Taylor rule. The coe¢ cients which we have used are are
￿￿ = 1:2, which means that the rule satis￿es the ￿ Taylor principle￿ , and ￿y = 0. We set b5 =
100, a large number. The size of this is decided so as to force the bond stock to be that
which the private sector would willingly hold, at the interest rate dictated by the Taylor rule
(and after allowing for the fact that some of this bonds stock will be held by foreigners).
3.6 Exogenous Shocks
In this paper, we focus on three shocks: aid, which in￿ uences the government￿ s need for
funds; demand shock which a⁄ects government expenditure on non-tradables; and cost push
shock which a⁄ects the Phillips curve.
at ￿ a = araa(at￿1 ￿ a) + ￿at (27)
gNt ￿ gN = argg(gNt￿1 ￿ gN) + ￿gt (28)
cpt ￿ cp = arcc(cpt￿1 ￿ cp) + ￿ct (29)
These shocks are with parameters: araa = argg = arcc = 0:50.
3.7 Solution
The model is solved using DYNARE. (See Julliard, 1996). There are three forward-looking
variables in the model: (i) consumption, (ii) non-traded-goods in￿ ation, and (iii) the exchange
12rate. 3 This forward-lookingness is important to the model￿ s behaviour.
4 Results
4.1 Cost push shock
Figures 1 - 4 show the responses to a cost shock, under various exchange rate regimes and
di⁄ering assumptions concerning the openness of the international capital account.
The shock takes the form of a gradually declining shock to the Calvo-type Phillips curve
for non-traded goods, with a persistence parameter of 0.5.
Figure 1 shows the case of a ￿xed exchange rate regime. Under ￿xed exchange rates this
causes in￿ ation in non-traded goods prices and a smaller rate of in￿ ation in the CPI. Because
there is limited international capital market integration, and because the stock of bonds is
￿xed, the interest rate rises, as domestic asset holders seek to move funds abroad in face of
the increase in in￿ ation; although the supply of money increases it does so by less than the
increase in the demand for money. As a result of the rise in the interest rate, consumption
falls. At the same time, there is a recession, which moderates the increase in in￿ ation. This
increase in in￿ ation is further moderated by the fact that, with a ￿xed exchange rate, the
price level must return to base. With forward-looking in￿ ation, this acts in the Phillips curve
as an immediate discipline on in￿ ationary pressures. With more persistence in the Phillips
curve (i.e. increasing the proportion of backward-looking agents) the degree of overshoot in
in￿ ation might well be more.
When the currency is ￿ oated, with a ￿xed stock of money, it is di¢ cult to achieve good
system behaviour. This is because currency substitution means that, in the presence of
in￿ ation, individuals substitute foreign assets for money in providing liquidity, which loosens
the nominal anchor. As a result of this we have simulated a ￿ oating exchange rate regime
with a ￿xed stock of bonds, not money. (See Figure 2). The e⁄ect of this is to allow more
in￿ ation than under ￿xed exchange rates, because in this model the bonds are real bonds
which are indexed with in￿ ation. The anchor to in￿ ation is thus much less in this regime
then it would be if there were a ￿xed nominal asset.
The outcome is such that asset stock decisions ￿the decision to ￿ oat but to ￿x the stock of
bonds - has real consequences for both the long run, and the short run. In this case the short
run real interest rate rises by more, but the downwards ￿ oat in the exchange rate means that
the real exchange rate appreciates by less, so that there is actually less of an appreciation of
3Even when the exchange rate follows a tightly crawling peg, the model is solved with the exchange rate
as a jump variable; the solution method simply forces the jump to be nearly zero.
13the real exchange rate than under ￿xed exchange rates.
As shown in Figure 3, when there is an open international capital account, with foreign
asset holders following UIP entering the market, then the rise in the interest rate just de-
scribed will attract capital in￿ ow. This will further appreciate the exchange rate, relative to
what it would have been under a ￿ oating regime without UIP and will also lower the real
interest rate. The capital mobility moderates the shock. But the behaviour of real interest
rates is quite surprising in the short run ￿it actually falls in the very short-run, in the pres-
ence of a cost-push shock. This is because the in￿ ow of funds into domestic bonds decreases
the supply of bonds available for the domestic private sector.
The introduction of a Taylor rule along with an open international capital account smooths
the behaviour of the real interest rate ￿it rises by less but the short term fall is also avoided.
It also dampens, overall, the e⁄ect of the shock on the economy (see Figure 4). The outcome
is that there is more in￿ ation but the e⁄ect on domestic consumption of monetary policy is
moderated.
In summary, the cost push shock under a ￿xed exchange rate regime leads to what is
shown here. This is a satisfactory process of adjustment, and appears to result from the a high
degree of price ￿ exibility. In the ￿ oating exchange rate regime with currency substitution, the
￿xed supply of bonds leads to a signi￿cant increase in the real interest rate which causes an
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Given a ￿xed level of bonds, the dynamics of money
and foreign currency holdings are complicated without a high degree of capital mobility, i.e.
if there are no foreign capital in￿ ows, and this signi￿cantly in￿ uences the resulting outcome.
When there is foreign capital in￿ ow, and the ￿ oating exchange rate regime is coupled with
UIP, but with a ￿xed level of the bond stock, rather than with a Taylor rule, the real interest
rate initially falls with the in￿ ow of foreign capital. This e⁄ect is moderated by the inclusion
of a Taylor rule. It appears possible that the e⁄ects of the in￿ ationary shock on the non-
traded goods sector can be shifted abroad by the introduction of UIP and Taylor rule.
4.2 Demand shock ￿government expenditure shock
Figures 5 - 8 show the response to a demand shock, in the form of a gradually declining
government expenditure shock, which is ￿nanced by the issue of money. The autoregressive
parameter is 0.5.
In Figure 5, this shock causes in￿ ation in non-traded goods prices and a smaller increase
in in￿ ation of the CPI. Because there is limited international capital-market integration, and
the stock of bonds is ￿xed, the interest rate rises, as domestic asset holders seek to move
funds abroad in face of the increase in in￿ ation; although the supply of money increases it
does so by less than the increase in the demand for money, just as in the case of a cost push
14shock. As a result of the rise in the interest-rate, consumption falls ￿a crowding out of the
shock under ￿xed exchange rates - and the real exchange rate appreciates, adding to this
crowding out. As a result, there is a recession, which moderates the increase in in￿ ation.
The increase in in￿ ation is further moderated by the fact that, with a ￿xed exchange rate,
the price level must return to base. With forward-looking in￿ ation, this requirement acts
as an immediate discipline on in￿ ationary pressure. With more persistence the degree of
overshoot of in￿ ation might well be larger.
As before we have simulated a ￿ oating exchange rate regime with a ￿xed stock of bonds,
not money. (See Figure 6). The e⁄ect is that there can be more in￿ ation than under ￿xed
exchange rates, again because the bonds are real bonds which are indexed with in￿ ation, and
the anchor to in￿ ation is thus less in this regime than it would be if there were a ￿xed nominal
asset. The outcome is one in which the short run real interest rate rises by more than under
a ￿xed exchange rate, but the downwards ￿ oat in the nominal exchange rate means that the
real exchange rate appreciates by less, so that there is actually less of an appreciation of the
real exchange rate than under ￿xed exchange rates. Thus ￿ oating the exchange rate serves
to moderate the shock.
If there is an open international capital account, with foreign asset holders following UIP,
then the rise in the interest rate just described will attract capital in￿ ow. (See Figure 7).
This will appreciate the exchange rate, and that will also lower the interest rate relative to
what it would have been. The capital mobility thus moderates the shock. But the behaviour
of the real interest rate is again quite surprising in the short run ￿it actually falls in the very
short-run, just like in the presence of a cost-push shock. This is again because the in￿ ow of
funds into domestic bonds decreases the supply of bonds available for the domestic private
sector, which forces down the interest rate in such a way as to make the real interest rate
fall.
The introduction of Taylor rule, along with the open international capital account over-
comes this short-term fall in the real interest rate ￿the nominal interest rate rises by more
and the real interest rate rises initially. (See Figure 8). But just as with the in￿ ation shock
the control of the shock is more gradual; the boom remains larger and the period of in￿ ation
lasts longer.
4.3 Aid shock
Figures 9 - 12 show the response to an aid shock, in which the aid is all passed on to the
private sector by means of a cut in taxes. Figure 9 shows the e⁄ect with a ￿xed exchange
rate. Again this causes in￿ ation in non-traded goods prices and a smaller rate of in￿ ation
in the CPI. But, as in previous shocks, because there is limited international capital market
15integration, and the stock of bonds is ￿xed, the interest rate initially rises, as domestic asset
holders seek to move funds abroad, in face of the increase in in￿ ation; but very quickly the
supply of money increases, and does so by more than the increase in the demand for money,
and so the interest rate falls. As a result of the fall in interest rates, consumption rises.
This means that there is a boom in the short run. The increase in the in￿ ation is however
moderated by the fact that, with a ￿xed exchange rate, the price level must return to base.
With forward-looking in￿ ation, this again acts as a discipline on in￿ ationary pressure, even
in the short run.
As in the case of the other shocks, we have simulated a ￿ oating exchange rate regime
with a ￿xed stock of bonds, not money, when the only international integration of the capital
market is through currency substitution. (See Figure 10). The e⁄ect is there can be more
in￿ ation than under ￿xed exchange rates, because the bonds are real bonds which are indexed
with in￿ ation. Again, as previously, asset stock decisions have real consequences for both the
long run and the short run. In this case in the short run the exchange rate appreciates. The
reason for this is clear - under a ￿xed exchange rate there has been a balance of payments
surplus, which, if the exchange rate ￿ oats and causes an appreciation. The outcome is such
a large appreciation of the exchange rate that in￿ ation actually falls, again because there is
little openness of the capital market internationally. But the size of the shock is not greatly
dampened; it has its e⁄ect though the increase in domestic demand which it causes.
If there is an open international capital account, with foreign asset holders following
UIP then the exchange rate jump appreciates, as shown in Figure 11. The behaviour of
the exchange rate, and that of the real interest rate, are in￿ uenced in the short run by the
movement in asset stocks.
Figure 12 shows that the introduction of Taylor rule along with the open international
capital account curtails these short-run movements and means that the real exchange rate
jumps to its long run equilibrium rate, along with consumption. The combination of an open
international capital account and a Taylor rule causes an immediate external adjustment to
the shock, though currency adjustment, something which is not possible if monetary policy
is tied down by an explicit rule limiting the availability of one or other of the asset stocks.
5 Conclusion
In summary, we have shown that, under a ￿xed-exchange-rate regime, there is a satisfactory
process of adjustment, something which is to be expected, given the high degree of price
￿ exibility which is assumed. In the ￿ oating exchange rate regime with currency substitution,
experiments not reported here show that managing the economy with ￿xed stock of money
16can give rise to signi￿cant oscillations, due to movements by the private sector out of money
and into foreign assets as a result of currency substitution. But similarly, a ￿xed supply
of bonds can lead to large changes in the real interest rate, again because the dynamics of
money and foreign currency holdings are complex. We have shown that this can happen if
there are no foreign capital in￿ ows. We have also shown that it can happen when there is a
￿ oating exchange rate regime with UIP, but with a ￿xed level of the stock of bonds. However
we have also shown that such e⁄ects are moderated by the inclusion of a Taylor rule. It
appears, from this work, that if there is not to be a ￿xed exchange rate regime - or a crawling
exchange-rate regime of the kind which we have not examined in this paper ￿then ￿ oating
exchange-rate regimes can present some di¢ culties if the stocks of one of the ￿nancial assets
is ￿xed. These di¢ culties are magni￿ed if there is international capital in￿ ow which is not
moderated but the stocks of one of the ￿nancial assets is ￿xed. It appears that, in these
circumstances, what is needed is that monetary policy also adopt a Taylor rule.
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29Figure 12: Africa ￿ oat exchange rate with UIP and Taylor rule - aid shock
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